UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 18-891-DMG Plaintiff, ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL DATE AND FINDINGS REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL v. ACT [45] ROBIN DIMAGGIO, JURY TRIAL DATE: Defendant. 8-27-2019 at 8:30 a.m. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE: 8-14-2019 at 2:30 p.m

The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Regarding Request for (1) Continuance of Trial Date and (2) Findings of Excludable Time Periods Pursuant to Speedy Trial Act, filed by the parties in this matter on July 5, 2019. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that support a continuance of the trial date in this matter, and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance

would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendant continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:

- 1. The trial in this matter is continued from July 23, 2019 to August 27, 2019 at 8:30 a.m. The pretrial conference is continued to August 14, 2019 at 2:30 p.m.
- 2. The time period of July 23, 2019 through August 27, 2019, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv).
- 3. Defendant shall appear in Courtroom 8C of the Federal Courthouse, 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California on August 14, 2019 at 2:30 p.m. and on August 27, 2019 at 8:30 a.m.
- 4. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

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July 8, 2019

DATE

DOLLY M. GEE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE